

cooperation with other racial groups and limited its membership to black Africans. During the urban uprisings of the 1970s and 1980s, young people supporting the Black Consciousness movements and those following Mandela and the ANC waged war against each other in the townships of South African cities. Perhaps most threatening to the unity of the nationalist struggle were the separatist tendencies of the Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party. Its leader, Gatsha Buthelezi, had cooperated with the apartheid state and even received funding from it. As negotiations for a transition to African rule unfolded in the early 1990s, considerable violence between Inkatha followers, mostly Zulu migrant workers, and ANC supporters broke out in a number of cities. None of this, however, approached the massive killing of Hindus and Muslims that accompanied the partition of India. South Africa, unlike India, acquired its political freedom as an intact and unified state.

PRACTICING AP® HISTORICAL THINKING

How and why did the anticolonial struggles in India and South Africa differ?

Experiments with Freedom

Africa's first modern nationalist hero, Kwame Nkrumah (KWAH-may ehn-KROO-mah) of Ghana, paraphrased a biblical quotation when he urged his followers, "Seek ye first the political kingdom and all these other things will be added unto you." But would winning the political kingdom of independence or freedom from European rule really produce "all these other things"—release from state oppression, industrial growth, economic development, reasonably unified nations, and a better life for all? That was the central question confronting the new nations emerging from colonial rule. They were joined in that quest by already independent but nonindustrialized countries and regions such as China, Thailand, Ethiopia, Iran, Turkey, and Central and South America. Together they formed the bloc of nations known variously as the third world, the developing countries, or the Global South. Those countries accounted for about 90 percent of the fourfold increase in human numbers that the world experienced during the twentieth century. Between 1950 and 2000, the populations of Asia and Africa alone grew from 64 percent of the world's total to 70 percent, with an estimated increase to 79 percent by 2050. (See Snapshot: World Population Growth, page 994.) That immense surge in global population, at one level a great triumph for the human species, also underlay many of the difficulties these nations faced as they conducted their various experiments with freedom.

Almost everywhere, the moment of independence generated something close to euphoria. Having emerged from the long night of colonial rule, free peoples had the opportunity to build anew. The developing countries would be laboratories for fresh approaches to creating modern states, nations, cultures, and economies. In the decades that followed, experiments with freedom multiplied, but the early optimism was soon tempered by the difficulties and disappointments of those tasks.

AP® EXAM TIP


Pay attention to examples of struggles faced by emerging independent countries in the twentieth century.

AP® EXAM TIP

Rapid global population growth in the twentieth century is an important element of the AP® curriculum.

SNAPSHOT World Population Growth, 1950–2011

The great bulk of the world's population growth in the second half of the twentieth century occurred in the developing countries of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America.¹²



Experiments in Political Order: Party, Army, and the Fate of Democracy

All across the developing world, efforts to create political order had to contend with a set of common conditions. Populations were exploding, and expectations for independence ran very high, often exceeding the available resources. Many developing countries were culturally very diverse, with little loyalty to a central state. Nonetheless, public employment mushroomed as the state assumed greater responsibility for economic development. In conditions of widespread poverty and weak private economies, groups and individuals sought to capture the state, or parts of it, both for the salaries and status it offered and for the opportunities for private enrichment that public office provided.

This was the formidable setting in which developing countries had to hammer out new political systems. The range of that effort was immense: Communist Party control in China, Vietnam, and Cuba; multiparty democracy in India and South

Africa; one-party democracy in Mexico, Tanzania, and Senegal; military regimes for a time in much of Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East; personal dictatorships in Uganda and the Philippines. In many places, one kind of political system followed another in kaleidoscopic succession.

As colonial rule drew to a close, European authorities in many places attempted to transplant democratic institutions to colonies they had long governed with such a heavy and authoritarian hand. They established legislatures, permitted elections, allowed political parties to operate, and in general anticipated the development of constitutional, parliamentary, multiparty democracies similar to their own.

It was in India that such a political system established its deepest roots. There Western-style democracy, including regular elections, multiple parties, civil liberties, and peaceful changes in government, has been practiced almost continuously since independence. What made this remarkable democratic continuity possible?

The struggle for independence in India had been a prolonged affair, thus providing time for an Indian political leadership to sort itself out. Furthermore, the British began to hand over power in a gradual way well before complete independence was granted in 1947. Thus a far larger number of Indians had useful administrative or technical skills than was the case elsewhere. In sharp contrast to most African countries, for example, the nationalist movement in India was embodied in a single national party (the Congress Party), which encompassed a wide variety of other parties and interest groups. Its leaders, Gandhi and Nehru in particular, were genuinely committed to democratic practice, which, some have argued, allowed elites from the many and varied groups of Indian society to find a place in the political system. Even the tragic and painful partition of colonial India into two countries minimized a major source of internal discord as independent India was born. Moreover, Indian statehood could be built on common cultural and political traditions that were far more deeply rooted than in many former colonies.

Elsewhere in the colonial world, democracy proved a far more fragile transplant. Among the new states of Africa, for example, few retained their democratic institutions beyond the initial post-independence decade. Many of the apparently popular political parties that had led the struggle for independence lost mass support and were swept away by military coups. When the army took power in Ghana in 1966, no one lifted a finger to defend the party that had led the country to independence only nine years earlier. Other states evolved into one-party systems, and still others degenerated into personal tyrannies or dictatorships. Freedom from colonial rule certainly did not automatically generate the internal political freedoms associated with democracy.

Africans sometimes suggested that their traditional cultures, based on communal rather than individualistic values and concerned with achieving consensus rather than majority rule, were not compatible with the competitiveness of party politics. Others argued that Western-style democracy was simply inadequate for the tasks of development confronting the new states. Creating national unity was surely more difficult when competing political parties identified primarily with particular ethnic

Guided Reading Question

■ CHANGE

What led to the erosion of democracy and the establishment of military government in much of Africa and Latin America?

or “tribal” groups, as was frequently the case in Africa. Certainly Europe did not begin its modernizing process with such a system. Why, many Africans asked, should they be expected to do so?

The economic disappointments of independence also contributed to the erosion of support for democracy. By almost any measure, African economic performance since independence has been the poorest in the developing world. As a result, college and high school graduates were unable to find the white-collar careers they expected; urban migrants had little opportunity for work; farmers received low prices for their cash crops; consumers resented shortages and inflation; and millions of impoverished and malnourished peasants lived on the brink of starvation. These were people for whom independence was unable to fulfill even the most minimal of expectations, let alone the grandiose visions of a better life that so many had embraced in the early 1960s. Since modern governments everywhere staked their legitimacy on economic performance, it is little wonder that many Africans became disaffected and withdrew their support from governments they had enthusiastically endorsed only a few years earlier. Further resentments arose from the privileges of the relatively well-educated elite who had found high-paying jobs in the growing bureaucracies of the newly independent states. Such grievances often found expression in ethnic conflict, as Africa’s immense cultural diversity became intensely politicized. An ethnically based civil war in Nigeria during the late 1960s cost the lives of millions, while in the mid-1990s ethnic hatred led Rwanda into the realm of genocide. (See Zooming In: Mozambique, page 998.)

These economic disappointments, class resentments, and ethnic conflicts provided the context for numerous military takeovers. By the early 1980s, the military had intervened in at least thirty of Africa’s forty-six independent states and actively governed more than half of them. In doing so, they swept aside the old political parties and constitutions and vowed to begin anew, while promising to return power to civilians and restore democracy at some point in the future.

A similar wave of military interventions swept over Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s, leaving Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Chile, Uruguay, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, and other countries governed at times by their armed forces. However, the circumstances in Latin America were quite different from those in Africa. While military rule was something new and unexpected in Africa, Latin American armed forces had long intervened in political life. The region had also largely escaped the bitter ethnic conflicts that afflicted so many African states, though its class antagonisms were more clearly defined and expressed. Furthermore, Latin American societies in general were far more modernized and urbanized than those of Africa. And while newly independent African states remained linked to their former European rulers, long-independent Latin American states lived in the shadow of a dominant United States. “Poor Mexico,” bemoaned Porfirio Díaz, that country’s dictator before the Mexican Revolution, “so far from God and so close to the United States.”

But beneath the changes in political regimes in Latin America lay the more deeply rooted transformations of the twentieth century: population growth and


AP® EXAM TIP

Take notes comparing post-independence conditions in Africa and Latin America.

large-scale migration from rural areas to the urban slums of big cities; industrial development and trade union activism; rural poverty and sharp divisions between rich and poor; resentment against American economic and political power; and the influence of ideas deriving from European socialism, the American New Deal, the Mexican Revolution, and Christian "liberation theology." All of this pushed Latin American politics away from the elitist orientation that had largely prevailed since independence toward concerns with economic development, social reform, mass participation, nationalism, and anti-imperialism.

These issues found expression in a wide range of political movements and government programs. Early in the century, the revolution in Mexico and a peaceful program of radical state-directed social reforms in Uruguay were early examples of the new politics. During the 1930s, the Aprista movement in Peru blended ideas of Latin American uniqueness, democratic socialism, the full integration of indigenous peoples into society, and anti-imperialism into a political outlook that had appeal in many parts of the continent. The "social justice" program of Juan Perón in Argentina between 1945 and 1955 enacted a large body of social and labor legislation, aimed largely at the mass of long-ignored and marginalized urban workers. A broadly similar program took shape in Brazil under the leadership of Getúlio Vargas. The Cuban Revolution of 1959 likewise gave expression to these ideas and sought to export them to the rest of Latin America. The 1960s and later years witnessed guerrilla warfare in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia and short-lived left-wing governments in Guatemala, Brazil, and Nicaragua.

Chile illustrated both these new political directions and the fears they generated. In 1970, Chileans narrowly elected to the presidency a Marxist politician, Salvador Allende, who soon launched an ambitious program to achieve a peaceful transition to socialism. In an effort to redistribute wealth, he ordered prices frozen and wages raised. Nationalization of major industries followed—including copper, coal, steel, and many banks—without compensation to their former owners, many of whom were foreign corporations. In rural areas, land reform programs soon seized large estates, redistributing them to small farmers. And Allende warmly welcomed Fidel Castro for a month-long visit in 1971. It was an audacious effort to achieve genuinely revolutionary change by legal and peaceful means.




Slums and Skyscrapers

The enormous disparities that have accompanied modern economic development in Latin America and elsewhere are illustrated in this photograph from São Paulo, Brazil. (© Florian Kopp/Image BROKER/age fotostock)

Mozambique: Civil War and Reconciliation

In the decades after independence, many Asian and African countries experienced bitter civil wars—Nigeria, Rwanda, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, and Burma among others. As their conflicts ended, these countries have faced the issue of reconciliation among former enemies who often hated, despised, and feared one another. Such has been the case in Mozambique, a Portuguese colony in southeastern Africa, which achieved its independence in 1975, after a ten-year armed struggle led by a party called the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO).

Mozambique's newly independent government, controlled by FRELIMO, came to power in a single-party Marxist-oriented state with strong support from the communist world. Some of its policies—a socialist agenda, dismissal of many traditional chiefs, imprisonment of opponents in “reeducation” camps, forced resettlement of scattered farmers in communal villages—soon antagonized many people. Opposition came together as the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) and found support from the threatened white-ruled regimes in neighboring Rhodesia and South Africa. As weapons from many sources flowed into the country, a terrible civil war erupted in 1977, lasting fifteen years. Alto-



The *Tree of Life* in Mozambique in 2005.

gether, 1 million or more people were killed and another 5 million were displaced, accounting for nearly half the country's population. On both sides, it was a brutal conflict, with RENAMO especially employing systematic mass killings, rape, and mutilation as a tactic of war. By the end of the 1980s, the military stalemate in Mozambique, coupled with the collapse of white rule in southern Africa and the abandonment of communism in the Soviet Union and China, provided conditions for negotiations, an end to the fighting, and finally a new constitution. In the early 1990s, Mozambique emerged as a democratic, multi-party, market-oriented democracy, and since then the nation has held regular elections every five years.

RENAMO supporters have participated in those elections, and some of their fighters have been integrated into Mozambique's military forces. But the Mozambican government has not initiated any large-scale process to deal with the enormous abuse and trauma that so many people experienced. State authorities authorized a general amnesty for all crimes committed during the civil war, but they expressed no official recognition of the suffering

photo: David Rose/Panos Pictures

But internal opposition mounted—from the bureaucracy, military officers, church hierarchy, and wealthy business and landlord elites as well as various small-business and middle-class elements, climaxing in a huge strike in late 1972. Furthermore, the U.S. government, which had long armed, funded, and trained military forces throughout Latin America, actively opposed the Allende regime, as did U.S. corporations. A CIA document declared, “It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup.”¹³ And in September 1973, he was. What followed was an extraordinarily repressive military regime, headed by General Augusto Pinochet, which lasted until the restoration of democracy in 1988.

involved or compassion for the victims. Nothing similar to South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission emerged in Mozambique. The government, Christian churches, and local chiefs alike urged forgiveness without revenge, but offered little to deal with the emotional scars and social conflicts that the civil war had generated. It was, critics charged, "reconciliation without truth." Indirectly, however, by acknowledging the legitimacy of customary institutions and practices, which FRELIMO had earlier tried to destroy, the government made it possible for local initiatives to operate within a traditional setting.

One of these initiatives involved the spirits of dead soldiers, known as *gamba*, who returned to possess particular individuals. Traditional healers created rituals designed to appease these spirits. Such ceremonies brought alienated people together, reminded them of the violence of the civil war, elicited confessions of wrongdoing, and set appropriate compensations. In these encounters, local people, whose families and communities were often torn apart by the war, found a way to confront the past and to experience some reconciliation within a culturally familiar setting.

Yet another remarkable private initiative of reconciliation with the past involved young people, many of whom had been forced to participate in the civil war as teenagers. In partnership with the Christian Council of Mozambique, they created a "transforming weapons into tools" project, which sought to collect and destroy some

of the millions of weapons left over from the civil war. Animated by the biblical "swords into plowshares" notion, this project invited people to exchange their weapons for tools, such as sewing machines, hoes, plows, bicycles, and construction material. Hundreds of thousands of weapons, perhaps millions, were turned in. One village that recovered a very large number of weapons received a tractor in return. The weapons were then taken apart and turned over to Mozambican artists, who fashioned them into remarkable sculptures—chairs, trees, animals, musical instruments, bicycles, human figures, and more.

Among the most memorable of those sculptures was a *Tree of Life*, some ten feet tall and weighing 1,000 pounds, accompanied by birds and animals, all made from pieces of dismantled weapons. The symbolism of weapons transformed into objects of comfort or inspiration allowed people to confront the past, while evoking some sense of hope and possibility from the tragedy of the civil war. There was irony too in this project. The *Tree of Life* was commissioned by and displayed in the British Museum, thus returning to Europe some of the weapons that originated in Europe to fuel the civil war in Mozambique.

Questions: What common features do these various reconciliation efforts share, and how do they differ? What possible responses to them can you imagine?

Chile's return to democratic practice was a small part of a remarkable late twentieth-century political reversal, a globalization of democracy that brought popular movements, multiparty elections, and new constitutions to many countries all around the world. This included the end of military and autocratic rule in Spain, Portugal, and Greece as well as the stunning rise of democratic movements, parties, and institutions amid the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. But the most extensive expression of this global reemergence of democracy lay in the developing countries. By 2000, almost all Latin American countries had abandoned their military-controlled regimes and returned to some form of

democratic governance. So too did most African states previously ruled by soldiers, dictators, or single parties. In Asia, authoritarian regimes, some long established, gave way to more pluralistic and participatory political systems in South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, the Philippines, Iraq, and Indonesia. And in 2011, mass movements in various Arab countries—Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Bahrain, Yemen—had challenged or ended the hold of entrenched, corrupt, and autocratic rulers, while proclaiming their commitment to democracy, human dignity, and honest government. What might explain this global pattern and its expression in the Global South in particular?

AP® EXAM TIP

You should know about the rise of democracy in many places in the world since around 1980.

One factor surely was the untethering of the ideas of democracy and human rights from their Western origins. By the final quarter of the twentieth century, democracy was increasingly viewed as a universal political principle to which all could aspire rather than an alien and imposed system deriving from the West. Democracy, like communism, feminism, modern science, and Christianity, was a Western import that took root and substantially lost its association with the West. It was therefore increasingly available as a vehicle for social protest in the rest of the world.

Perhaps the most important internal factor favoring a revival of democracy lay in the apparent failure of authoritarian governments to remedy disastrous economic situations, to raise standards of living, to provide jobs for the young, and to curb pervasive corruption. The oppressive and sometimes-brutal behavior of repressive governments humiliated and outraged many. Furthermore, the growth of civil society with its numerous voluntary groups provided a social foundation, independent of the state, for demanding change. Disaffected students, professionals, urban workers, religious organizations, women's groups, and more joined in a variety of grass-roots movements, some of them mobilized through social media, to insist on democratic change as a means to a better life. Such movements found encouragement in the demands for democracy that accompanied the South African struggle against apartheid and the collapse of Soviet and Eastern European communism. And the end of the cold war reduced the willingness of the major industrial powers to underwrite their authoritarian client states.

But the consolidation of democratic practice was an uncertain and highly variable process. Some elected leaders, such as Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Vladimir Putin in Russia, turned authoritarian once in office. Even where parliaments existed, they were often quite circumscribed in their powers. Outright electoral fraud tainted democratic institutions in many places, while established elites and oligarchies found it possible to exercise considerable influence even in formal democracies, and not only in the Global South. Chinese authorities brutally crushed a democratic movement in 1989. The Algerian military sponsored elections in 1992 and then abruptly canceled them when an Islamic party seemed poised to win. And the political future of the Arab Spring remained highly uncertain, as a military strongman became a civilian politician and returned to power in Egypt in 2014. Nonetheless, this worldwide revival of democracy represented the globalization of what had been a Western idea and the continuation of the political experiments that had begun with independence.

Experiments in Economic Development: Changing Priorities, Varying Outcomes

At the top of the agenda everywhere in the Global South was economic development, a process that meant growth or increasing production as well as distributing the fruits of that growth to raise living standards. This quest for development, now operating all across the planet, represented the universal acceptance of beliefs unheard of not many centuries earlier—that poverty was no longer inevitable and that it was possible to deliberately improve the material conditions of life for everyone. Economic development was a central promise of all independence struggles, and it was increasingly the standard by which people measured and granted legitimacy to their governments.

Achieving economic development, however, was no easy or automatic task. It took place in societies sharply divided by class, religion, ethnic group, and gender and in the face of explosive population growth. In many places, colonial rule had provided only the most slender foundations for modern development, as new nations often came to independence with low rates of literacy, few people with managerial experience, a weak private economy, and transportation systems oriented to export rather than national integration. Furthermore, the entire effort occurred in a world split by rival superpowers and economically dominated by the powerful capitalist economies of the West. Despite their political independence, most developing countries had little leverage in negotiations with the wealthy nations of the Global North and their immense transnational corporations. It was hardly an auspicious environment in which to seek a fundamental economic transformation.

Beyond these difficulties lay the question of what strategies to pursue. The academic field of “development economics” was new; its experts disagreed and often changed their minds; and conflicting political pressures, both internal and international, only added to the confusion. All of this resulted in considerable controversy, changing policies, and much experimentation.

One fundamental issue lay in the role of the state. All across the developing world and particularly in newly independent nations, most people expected that state authorities would take major responsibility for spurring the economic development of their countries. After all, the private economy was weakly developed; few entrepreneurs had substantial funds to invest; the example of rapid Soviet industrialization under state direction was hopeful; and state control held the promise of protecting vulnerable economies from the ravages of international capitalism. Some state-directed economies had real successes. China launched a major industrialization effort and massive land reform under the leadership of the Communist Party. A communist Cuba, even while remaining dependent on its sugar production, wiped out illiteracy and provided basic health care to its entire population, raising life expectancy to seventy-six years by 1992, equivalent to that of the United States. Elsewhere as well—in Turkey, India, South Korea, and much of Africa—the state provided tariffs, licenses, loans, subsidies, and overall planning, while most productive property was owned privately.

AP® EXAM TIP

Make sure you can identify regions in the “Global South” and their significance in the second half of the twentieth century.

Guided Reading Question

■ CHANGE

What obstacles impeded the economic development of third-world countries?

Guided Reading Question**■ CHANGE**

How and why did thinking about strategies for economic development change over time?

AP® EXAM TIP

You need to know examples of international organizations that promoted free market economies, like the World Bank.

Yet in the last three decades of the twentieth century, an earlier consensus in favor of state direction largely collapsed, replaced by a growing dependence on the market to generate economic development. This was most apparent in the abandonment of much communist planning in China and the return to private farming (see Chapter 21, pages 959–60). India and many Latin American and African states privatized their state-run industries and substantially reduced the role of the state in economic affairs. In part, this sharp change in economic policies reflected the failure, mismanagement, and corruption of many state-run enterprises, but it was also influenced by the collapse in the Soviet Union of the world's first state-dominated economy. Western pressures, exercised through international organizations such as the World Bank, likewise pushed developing countries in a capitalist direction. In China and India, the new approach generated rapid economic growth, but also growing inequalities and social conflict. But as the new millennium dawned, a number of developing countries once again asserted a more prominent role for the state in their quests for economic development and social justice. In China, Russia, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, India, and elsewhere, state-owned companies currently buy and sell shares on the stock market, seeking profits in an economic system that has been called “state capitalism.” Thus the search for an appropriate balance between state action and market forces in the management of modern economies continues.

A related issue involved the most appropriate posture for developing countries to adopt toward the world market as they sought to industrialize. Should they try to shield themselves from the influences of international capitalism, or were they better off vigorously engaging with the global economy? In the aftermath of the Great Depression of the 1930s, many Latin American countries followed the first path. Their traditional reliance on exporting agricultural products and raw materials had largely collapsed as the world economy sharply contracted (see Chapter 20, page 893). So they chose an alternative approach, known as import substitution industrialization, intended to reduce their dependence on the uncertain global marketplace by processing their own raw materials and manufacturing their own consumer goods behind high tariff barriers if necessary.

Brazil, for example, largely followed such policies from the 1930s through the late 1970s with some success. Between 1968 and 1974, the country experienced rapid industrial growth, dubbed the “Brazilian miracle.” By the early 1980s, the country produced about 90 percent of its own consumer goods. But Brazil's industrialization was also accompanied by massive investment by foreign corporations, by the accumulation of a huge national debt to foreign lenders, by periodic bouts of inflation, and by very high levels of social inequality and poverty. Brazil's military president famously remarked in 1971: “The economy is doing fine but the people are doing badly.”

The classic contrast to Latin American approaches to industrial development lay in East Asia, where South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore chose a different strategy. Rather than focusing on industrial production for domestic con-

sumption, they chose to specialize in particular products for an export market—textiles, electronic goods, and automobiles, for example. Many of these industries were labor-intensive, drawing large numbers of women into the workforce, though at very low wages. Initiated in the 1960s, this export-led industrialization strategy generated rapid economic growth, propelling these countries into the ranks of the industrialized world by the end of the century. In the 1980s and 1990s, Brazil too entered the world market more vigorously, developing export industries in automobiles, steel, aircraft, computers, and more.

Other issues as well inspired debate. In many places, an early emphasis on city-based industrial development, stirred by visions of a rapid transition to modernity, led to a neglect or exploitation of rural areas and agriculture. This “urban bias” subsequently came in for much criticism and some adjustment in spending priorities. (See Snapshot: Global Urbanization, page 1004.) A growing recognition of the role of women in agriculture led to charges of “male bias” in development planning and to mounting efforts to assist women farmers directly. Women were also central to many governments’ increased interest in curtailing population growth. Women’s access to birth control, education, and employment, it turned out, provided powerful incentives to limit family size. Another debate pitted the advocates of capital- and technology-driven projects (dams and factories, for example) against those who favored investment in “human capital,” such as education, technical training, health care, and nutrition. The benefits and drawbacks of foreign aid, investment, and trade have likewise been contentious issues.

Economic development was never simply a matter of technical expertise or deciding among competing theories. Every decision was political, involving winners and losers in terms of power, advantage, and wealth. Where to locate schools, roads, factories, and clinics, for example, provoked endless controversies, some of them expressed in terms of regional or ethnic rivalries. It was an experimental process, and the stakes were high.

The results of those experiments have varied considerably. (See Snapshot, Chapter 23, page 1031, for global variations in economic development.) East Asian countries in general have had the strongest record of economic growth. South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong were dubbed “newly industrialized countries,” and China boasted the most rapid economic growth in the world by the end of the twentieth century, replacing Japan as the world’s second-largest economy. In the 1990s, Asia’s other giant, India, opened itself more fully to the world market and launched rapid economic growth with a powerful high-tech sector and an expanding middle class. Oil-producing countries reaped a bonanza when they were able to demand much higher prices for that essential commodity in the 1970s and later. By 2008, Brazil ranked as the eighth-largest economy in the world with a rapidly growing industrial sector, while Turkey and Indonesia numbered in the top twenty. Limited principally to Europe, North America, and Japan in the nineteenth century, industrialization had become a global phenomenon by the early twenty-first.

AP® EXAM TIP

You should know that these East Asian economies are known as the “Asian Tigers.”

SNAPSHOT Global Urbanization, 1950–2014

In 1950, 29.6 percent of the world's population lived in urban areas, while by 2014 that figure had risen to 54 percent. This chart highlights the top twenty cities in terms of their population in those two years.¹⁴ What changes can you identify in the size of those cities and in their geographic distribution?

1950				2014		
Rank	City	Country	Population in millions	City	Country	Population in millions
1	New York City	USA	12.3	Tokyo	Japan	37.8
2	Tokyo	Japan	11.3	Delhi	India	24.9
3	London	UK	8.4	Shanghai	China	23.0
4	Paris	France	6.5	Mexico City	Mexico	20.84
5	Moscow	USSR	5.6	São Paulo	Brazil	20.83
6	Buenos Aires	Argentina	5.1	Mumbai	India	20.7
7	Chicago	USA	5.0	Osaka	Japan	20.1
8	Calcutta	India	4.5	Beijing	China	19.5
9	Shanghai	China	4.3	New York/Newark	USA	18.6
10	Osaka	Japan	4.2	Cairo	Egypt	18.4
11	Los Angeles	USA	4.0	Dhaka	Bangladesh	17.0
12	Berlin	Germany	3.3	Karachi	Pakistan	16.1
13	Philadelphia	USA	3.1	Buenos Aires	Argentina	15.0
14	Rio de Janeiro	Brazil	2.95	Calcutta	India	14.8
15	Leningrad/St. Petersburg	USSR	2.9	Istanbul	Turkey	14.0
16	Mexico City	Mexico	2.88	Chongqing	China	12.9
17	Bombay/Mumbai	India	2.86	Rio de Janeiro	Brazil	12.8
18	Detroit	USA	2.77	Manila	Philippines	12.76
19	Boston	USA	2.55	Lagos	Nigeria	12.6
20	Cairo	Egypt	2.5	Los Angeles area	USA	12.3

AP® EXAM TIP

Pay attention to the examples of continuities and changes in city populations in the Snapshot above.

Elsewhere, the story was very different. In most of Africa, much of the Arab world, and parts of Asia—regions representing about one-third of the world's population—there was little sign of catching up, and there had been frequent examples of declining standards of living since the end of the 1960s. Between 1980 and 2000 the average income in forty-three of Africa's poorest countries dropped by 25 percent, pushing living standards for many below what they had been at independence.